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Abstract 
Background and objectives. Mental imagery can evoke strong emotional responses, but 
imagery perspective can influence the response, with observer perspective reducing 
emotionality. This is important provided that positive imagery can be an effective mood 
repairing strategy in healthy individuals. However, (sub-clinical) depressed individuals tend 
to spontaneously adopt an observer perspective. We investigated whether positive imagery 
would result in a similar emotional response in dysphoric and non-dysphoric individuals when 
instructed and trained to use field perspective imagery. Additionally, we compared the 
emotional response in dysphoric individuals who received instructions to dysphoric 
individuals who received no instructions on processing mode during positive memory recall. 
Methods. Dysphoric and non-dysphoric individuals completed a mood induction procedure 
imagining positive or neutral memories. They received instructions and practice in the use of 
field perspective imagery. An additional control group of dysphoric individuals recalled 
positive memories without receiving instructions on processing mode. 
Results. Dysphoric and non-dysphoric individuals who received instructions on field 
perspective imagery reported similar use of field and observer perspective imagery, and a 
similar positive emotional response. Dysphoric individuals who did not receive specific 
instructions, as compared to those who did, reported greater use of observer perspective and 
lower levels of positive affect afterwards.  
Limitations. A dysphoric sample limits generalization to clinically depressed individuals, 
although these individuals are at risk for developing depression. However, mental imagery 
used in relapse prevention is likely targeting sub-clinical populations. 
Conclusions. Providing practice in field perspective imagery could potentially improve the 
effectiveness of positive memory recall as a mood repair strategy in (sub-clinically) depressed 
individuals, and may therefore have important therapeutic benefits.  
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1. Introduction 
Mental imagery has been used by researchers for a long time, but the use and 
applications of this technique has gained renewed interest in recent years. Mental imagery, 
encompassing visual as well as other sensory modalities, can have an important influence on 
emotion [1; 2]. It is therefore not surprising that mental images are believed to play a role in 
both the development and maintenance of different forms of psychopathology, such as 
posttraumatic stress disorder [3] and depression [2]. Although the use of mental imagery in 
psychotherapeutic interventions is not novel, the last decades have witnessed an increase in 
the application of mental imagery (e.g. imagery rescripting) for clinical purposes [4].  
In the literature a distinction is made between imagery from a field perspective and 
imagery from an observer perspective. Field perspective can be described as individuals 
experiencing events through their own eyes, perceiving a situation as if they experience it at 
this moment from their in-body point of view, while observer perspective is described as 
individuals taking the perspective of a spectator, seeing themselves as characters in the 
imagined situation [5]. Both perspectives can be experienced during the retrieval of a memory 
[6]. When imagining autobiographic memories, imagery perspective can influence the type of 
information that is recalled. Memories imagined from a field perspective tend to include 
statements concerning affective reactions, physical sensations, and psychological states, 
whereas observer perspective memories include information concerning how the person 
looked, physical actions, or spatial relations [5]. Studies in healthy samples show that the 
perspective taken during imagery of memories can also influence the emotional response to 
the imagined event. For instance, imagery from a field perspective, as compared to an 
observer perspective and/or verbal processing, has been related to a greater emotional 
response [1; 7-9; but 10 reported no differences between imagery perspectives).  
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 Interestingly, vantage point in mental imagery does not only seem to influence the 
intensity of the emotional response, but the different perspectives may even play a role in 
emotional disorders such as depression [11; 12; 13]. Previous research has shown that 
depression and dysphoria are related to a higher proportion of retrieving memories from an 
observer perspective [11; 14], though this may be specific for positive memories [12; 14]. 
Furthermore, dysphoria has been related to difficulties to vividly imagine positive future 
events and to lower positive ratings of visual images [15]. Depression is characterized by 
verbal processing of information in the form of rumination, which is in turn associated with 
reduced imagery and evaluative thinking about the self [e.g. 8]. Moreover, a higher 
occurrence of observer memories in depression has been linked to greater negative self-
evaluation, greater use of avoidance, and dissonance between the current self and ideal self 
[11; 16]. This has led to suggest that a verbal processing mode or an observer perspective 
promote evaluative thinking and increase the likelihood that the self is compared to a more 
ideal standard, in turn promoting unfavorable self-comparisons reducing the positive affective 
response [7; 11].  
In healthy individuals, the deliberate adoption of an observer (or third-person) 
perspective can have an emotion regulating effect by reducing negative emotions and related 
outcomes through the facilitation of a change in meaning or understanding of a negative 
situation, thereby functioning as a cognitive reappraisal strategy [17]. However, in depressed 
individuals, imagery of negative events or memories from an observer perspective is linked to 
greater avoidance and rumination [12; 13; 16]. Moreover, (spontaneous) use of observer 
perspective imagery also reduces the positive emotional response when imagining positive 
events or memories [7] and can reduce the effectiveness of using positive imagery as a mood 
repair strategy. Indeed, never depressed individuals can use positive autobiographical memory 
recall as a strategy to improve mood after a sad mood induction, but this has shown to be 
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ineffective for previously depressed individuals, and even had deteriorating effects for mood 
in currently depressed individuals [18]. A study in a subclinical dysphoric sample showed 
similar findings; whereas nondysphoric individuals could use positive memory recall to repair 
their sad mood, this was not effective in dysphoric individuals [19]. However, in these studies 
no instructions were provided on how to process the recalled positive memory. In a more 
recent study the effect of processing mode was investigated, that is, whether processing a 
positive memory in an abstract or more concrete way would influence the effectiveness of 
using positive memory recall to repair sad mood [20]. Currently and formerly depressed 
individuals were instructed to either think about a positive memory in terms of the causes and 
consequences of that event and its meaning (i.e. abstract processing), or to play the positive 
scene in their head like a movie (i.e. concrete processing). Using a more concrete way of 
processing the positive memory, as compared to abstract processing, resulted in improved 
mood [20]. A similar study with never-, formerly, and currently depressed individuals showed 
that processing positive memories in a more concrete way resulted in repair of sad mood for 
the never- and formerly depressed individuals (but abstract processing of positive memories 
did as well) [21]. However, depressed individuals could not use recall of positive memories to 
repair mood, regardless of processing mode [21]. One explanation for these mixed findings is 
that although the instructions for concrete processing of the positive memories may have 
promoted some form of imagery, it did not specifically promote field perspective imagery. 
Therefore, it’s possible that, especially in depressed individuals, the concrete processing mode 
manipulation induced observer perspective imagery which in turn might have attenuated the 
positive emotional response.   
The increased use of verbal processing and observer perspective imagery in 
(subclinical-) depressed individuals does not only reduce effectiveness of positive memory 
recall as a mood repair strategy but also affects applications of positive mental imagery in 
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treatment and relapse prevention. Research suggests that positive emotions play an important 
role in psychological resilience [e.g. the broaden-and-build theory; 22; 23]. Hence, positive 
mental imagery can be used to induce positive emotions and investigate the effects on 
psychological resilience. Although former research thus shows that depression and dysphoria 
are related to increased use of an observer perspective, reducing the emotionality of mental 
images [2], it remains unclear if positive imagery can elicit positive affect in (subclinical) 
depressed individuals when explicitly instructed and trained to use field perspective imagery. 
The main aim of this study was to investigate whether positive mental imagery would 
be as effective in evoking a positive emotional response in dysphoric individuals as in 
nondysphoric individuals when explicitly instructed and trained to use field perspective 
imagery. This is relevant as a deliberate shift in imagery perspective (when imagining positive 
events/memories) can be used as an emotion regulating strategy and therefore also has 
implications for use in therapeutic settings. We hypothesized that dysphoric individuals who 
received explicit instructions and practice in field perspective imagery would show similar 
levels as nondysphoric individuals in self-reported use of field and observer perspective 
imagery during recall of a positive memory. Furthermore, we expected that the positive 
emotional response to the imagined positive event would be of similar magnitude in 
dysphoric and nondysphoric individuals when explicitly instructed and practiced in use of 
field perspective imagery.  
A secondary aim of the study was to compare dysphoric individuals who were 
explicitly instructed and trained to use field perspective imagery to dysphoric individuals who 
received no such instructions during positive memory recall. Receiving no instructions allows 
for a more spontaneous way of processing the positive memory. Based on former research 
[e.g. 14] we expected dysphoric individuals who did not receive explicit instructions, as 
compared to dysphoric individuals who did receive such instructions during positive memory 
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recall, to adopt a field perspective to a lesser extent and an observer perspective to a greater 
extent. Moreover, we hypothesized that dysphoric individuals who did not receive explicit 
instructions, as compared to dysphoric individuals who did receive such instructions, to report 
an attenuated positive emotional response to positive memory recall.  
2. Method 
2.1 Participants 
The data in this study was retrieved from six studies using the mood induction 
procedure (MIP) as described below (pooled data n = 220)3. The six studies were done across 
different periods in time. From the combined datasets of these studies, all thirty-four 
dysphoric participants who reported a score of 14 or higher on the BDI-II at time of testing 
were included. From all participants who reported a score of less than 7 on the BDI-II we 
randomly selected 34 persons. To be able to compare dysphoric individuals who received 
instructions on field perspective imagery to those who did not, we tested another twenty-eight 
participants who had been invited based on their BDI-II scores (i.e. cut-off BDI-II ≥ 14)  in a 
pre-screening survey and they were tested in an extra control study. Eighteen of these 
participants were included in the analyses, as ten participants did not report a score on the 
BDI-II ≥ 14 at time of testing and were therefore not considered to be dysphoric at time of 
testing. In total 86 cases were analyzed (78 females), who were aged between 17 and 30 years 
(M = 19.84, SD = 2.48). All data was collected during studies approved by the local ethical 
committee and in accordance with the Helsinki Declaration of 1975, as revised in 2000. 
Informed consent was obtained from all participants for being included in the study.  
                                                 
3 Data from some of these studies has been used in the following publications: Grol, M., De Raedt, R. (2014). 
Effects of positive mood on attentional breadth for emotional stimuli. Frontiers in Psychology, 5: 1277. doi: 
10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01277.  
Grol, M., Koster, E.H.W., Bruyneel, L., & De Raedt, R. (2014). Effects of positive mood on attention 
broadening for self-related information. Psychological Research, 78, 566-573. doi: 10.1007/s00426-013-0508-6. 
Vanlessen, N., Rossi, V., De Raedt, R., & Pourtois, G. (2013). Positive emotion broadens attention focus through 
decreased position-specific spatial encoding in early visual cortex: evidence from ERPs. Cognitve, Affective, & 
Behavioral Neuroscience, 13, 60-79. doi:10.3758/s13415-012-0130-x 
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2.2 Materials 
2.2.1 Questionnaire measures. We used the self-report Beck Depression Inventory 
[BDI-II; 24; Dutch translation: 25) to measure presence and severity of depressive symptoms 
during the past two weeks.  
We assessed trait anxiety using the trait version of the State and Trait Anxiety 
Inventory [STAI-trait; 26; 27]. Participants were asked to rate how they feel “in general” on a 
4-point scale ranging from “almost never” to “almost always”.  
Mood state was measured using the state version of the 20 item Positive and Negative 
Affect Schedule [PANAS; 28]. Participants rated the degree to which they felt different 
emotions “at this moment” on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 “very slightly” to 5 “very 
much”.  
The tendency to use mental imagery in daily life was assessed using the Spontaneous 
Use of Imagery Scale [SUIS; 29; 30]. The questionnaire consists of 12 descriptions about 
using mental imagery in daily life. Participants were asked to rate the degree to which each 
description is appropriate for them on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 “never appropriate” to 5 
“always completely appropriate”, resulting in a total score ranging from 12 to 60.  
As a manipulation check during the mood induction procedure, participants were 
asked to rate the extent to which they adopted a field perspective and an observer perspective. 
Participants were asked to make their rating on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 “not at 
all” to 5 “extremely”. Both types of vantage perspective were assessed as previous research 
has shown that both perspectives can be experienced during the retrieval of a memory [6], 
even though instructions on using a field perspective are given in this study. 
2.2.2. Mood induction procedure. An imagery procedure was used to manipulate 
mood in which participants were instructed to vividly imagine either a neutral- or happy-
inducing autobiographical memory. Field perspective was first practiced using a mental 
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imagery task of cutting a lemon [7]. Following this practice task, participants were instructed 
to recall a memory of an event that happened on a specific day, more than one week ago. 
Participants in the positive MIP condition were instructed to recall an event that made them 
feel very happy at the time and happy as they think back to it, while participants in the neutral 
MIP condition were instructed to recall a memory that did not elicit strong negative or 
positive emotions when the event occurred. Participants were asked to close their eyes while 
imagining and describing in detail what they imagined. Participants were given instructions 
[based on 7; 31] to promote taking a field perspective while imagining the situation (e.g. “see 
it through your own eyes, from your own perspective”) and to promote concreteness (e.g. 
“focus on how the event happened and imagine in your mind as vividly and concretely as 
possible a ‘movie’ of how the event unfolded”). Participants imagined the event for 30 
seconds after which they were asked to focus on what they could see, hear, and feel (e.g. 
“What can you see?”, “What physical or bodily sensations do you feel?”) [based on 31]. 
Furthermore, they were asked to rate the manipulation check on adopting a field perspective 
and observer perspective and participants were told that we are interested in the extent to 
which they experienced both of these perspectives during recall. Following these questions, 
participants continued imagining the event for another 30 seconds without speaking up aloud 
about what they remembered. At the end, participants were asked again to rate the 
manipulation checks on adopting a field and observer perspective. During the mood 
induction, music was played to strengthen its mood-inducing effect. Across the experiments, 
different types of music were used in the positive mood condition: either Mike Oldfield’s 
“Music of the spheres” (track 2, 3, 5, and 6), Chopin’s “Waltzes Nos. 11 and 12”, or 
Tchaikovsky’s “Waltz of the flowers” and Mozart’s “Eine kleine Nachtmusik”. However, the 
different types of ‘positive music’ were balanced across dysphoric and non-dysphoric 
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participants. For the neutral MIP condition Chopin’s “Waltzes Nos. 11 and 12” were always 
used, which have been used before in a neutral mood induction [32; 33].  
In an extra control condition we used a similar positive mood induction procedure in 
which participants were instructed to recall a positive mood-inducing autobiographical 
memory of an event that happened on a specific day, more than one week ago. However, 
participants were not instructed to close their eyes, nor given instructions to promote taking a 
field perspective and to promote concreteness. Furthermore, the use of mental imagery was 
not practiced. Participants described the event for 30 seconds after which they were asked to 
rate the manipulation checks on adopting a field and observer perspective. After these checks, 
participants continued describing the event for another 30 seconds. At the end, participants 
were asked again to rate the manipulation checks. Similarly, as during the mood induction 
using mental imagery, music was played during the induction procedure. The different types 
of music used in the control positive mood induction were matched with the different types of 
music used in the positive imagery condition with dysphoric participants.   
2.3 Procedure 
Participants in the mental imagery conditions were randomized to receive either the 
neutral or positive MIP. After informed consent, baseline mood levels were measured with 
the PANAS. Following this, participants completed the MIP and at the end mood was 
measured again with the PANAS. At the end of the experiment the BDI-II and SUIS were 
administered. In the extra control condition everyone received the positive MIP without 
instructions on the use of mental imagery. Participants filled out the BDI-II, SUIS, and 
baseline mood levels were measured with the PANAS. This was followed by the MIP and 
after the MIP, the PANAS was administered again.  
3. Results 
3.1 Group Characteristics  
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Thirty-four dysphoric and 34 non-dysphoric participants were randomized to receive 
the happy or neutral mood induction. Furthermore, 18 dysphoric participants were assigned to 
the extra control condition receiving a positive MIP without imagery instructions. Table 1 
gives an overview of the means and standard deviations for the baseline variables. A 
univariate ANOVA on the SUIS scale with the five groups as between-subjects factor showed 
no group differences, F(4,76) = 0.36, p = .838, ηp² = .02. By design, non-dysphoric 
participants scored significantly lower on the BDI-II than dysphoric participants, regardless of 
the mood manipulation condition they were in (see Table 1). Similarly, non-dysphoric 
participants scored significantly lower on the STAI than dysphoric participants (see Table 1), 
likely because of the strong correlation between BDI-II scores and STAI scores, r = .80, p < 
.001.  
 
Table 1. Group Characteristics 
 
 
Dysphoric students 
M (SD) 
Non-dysphoric students 
M (SD) 
 
Neutral MIP 
(n = 16) 
Positive MIP 
(n = 18) 
Positive 
control MIP 
(n = 18) 
Neutral MIP 
(n = 18) 
Positive MIP 
(n = 16) 
Age 21.19 (3.94) 19.17 (2.31) 18.89 (1.75) 19.78 (1.77) 20.38 (1.54) 
Gender 15 females 18 females 13 females 17 females 15 females 
BDI-II 22.38 (6.59) 19.28 (5.63) 22.50 (6.81) 2.06 (2.01) 2.38 (2.31) 
STAI trait 
anxiety 
52.27 (6.83) 53.83 (7.29) 60 (7.55) 36.94 (9.22) 35.44 (9.00) 
SUIS 43.87 (6.77) 44.20 (9.05) 42.06 (6.95) 42.71 (8.90) 41.31 (8.24) 
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PANAS 
positive 
pre-MIP 
27.63 (4.77) 
28.67 
(5.213) 
26.00 (5.93) 35.78 (3.39) 33.87 (3.48) 
PANAS 
positive 
post-MIP 
26.19 (4.42) 35.56 (4.99) 30.44 (4.93) 35.55 (6.33) 37.50 (4.26) 
Field 
perspective 
4.16 (0.79) 4.14 (0.66) 3.97 (0.74) 4.44 (0.64) 4.20 (0.56) 
Observer 
perspective 
2.06 (0.95) 2.11 (1.06) 3.08 (1.06) 1.67 (0.77) 1.73 (0.56) 
Note: Nonparametric Mann-Whitney tests confirmed that non-dysphoric participants reported 
higher levels of BDI-II scores compared to dysphoric participants (regardless of MIP group), 
all p < .001. Similarly, independent t-tests showed that non-dysphoric participants reported 
higher levels of STAI scores compared to dysphoric participants (regardless of MIP group), 
all p < .001. Dysphoric participants in the control positive MIP group reported higher STAI 
scores than dysphoric participants in the neutral MIP group, t(31) = 3.06, p = .005, d = 1.07, 
and dysphoric participants in the positive MIP group, t(34) = 2.49, p = .018, d = 0.83. 
 
3.2 Imagery Perspective Manipulation Check  
Nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis tests were performed to check for differences between 
the five groups on the ratings of adopting a field perspective and observer perspective during 
the MIP (see also Table 1). These analyses yielded no significant group effect for the field 
perspective ratings, H(4) = 5,47, p = .242; however, for the observer perspective ratings a 
significant effect of group was found, H(4) = 18.54, p = .001. Follow-up analyses revealed 
that dysphoric participants in the positive control MIP group reported higher levels of 
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adopting an observer perspective compared to all other groups, all ps < .050. We further 
examined the correlation between BDI scores and the ratings for observer and field 
perspective imagery. The positive control MIP group with dysphoric individuals was not 
included in this correlation analysis, because they received different instructions (which is 
therefore confounded with BDI score). Across all participants receiving the imagery MIP, the 
BDI was significantly related to the ratings for observer perspective, r = .36, p = .003, but not 
to the ratings for a field perspective, r = -.15, p = .223, suggesting that an increase in severity 
of depressive symptoms was related to higher self-reported use of observer perspective 
imagery.  
3.3. Mood Manipulation Check 
To assess the effect of the MIP with imagery on positive mood (see Figure 1), we 
performed a mixed ANOVA with Time (before versus after the MIP) as within-subject factor 
and MIP group (neutral versus positive with imagery) and Dysphoria (dysphoric versus non-
dysphoric) as between-subject factors on the PANAS positive affect subscale. The ANOVA 
showed a significant main effect of Time, F(1,64) = 13.48, p < .001, ηp² = .17, a Time x MIP 
group interaction, F(1,64) = 27.81, p < .001, ηp² = .30, a non-significant Time x Dysphoria 
interaction, F(1,64) = 0.93, p = .338, ηp² = .01, and a marginally significant Time x MIP group 
x Dysphoria interaction, F(1,64) = 3.28, p = .075, ηp² = .054. The Time x MIP group 
interaction was driven by a significant increase in levels of positive affect in participants in 
the positive MIP group, t(33) = 5.60, p < .001, d = 1.09, while participants from the neutral 
MIP group did not show such an increase, t(33) = 1.28, p = .211, d = 0.13. An independent t-
test showed that dysphoric and non-dysphoric individuals receiving the positive MIP with 
                                                 
4 This Time x MIP group x Dysphoria interaction was driven by a marginally significant Time x Dysphoria 
interaction in the positive imagery MIP group, F(1,32) = 3.09, p = .088, ηp² = .09. This reflects that the dysphoric 
participants receiving the positive imagery MIP tended to report a greater increase in PANAS positive affect 
than non-dysphoric participants receiving the positive imagery MIP; however, this may be an effect of baseline 
differences in positive affect such that the dysphoric individuals have more room to increase. 
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imagery did not differ in ratings of positive affect after the MIP, t(32) = 1.22, p = .233, d = 
0.42, despite differences at baseline, t(32) = 3.38, p = .002, d = 1.16. 
 
 
Figure 1. Mean scores on the PANAS positive affect subscale before and after the mood 
induction, depicted per group. Error bars represent standard error from the mean. 
 
3.4 Effect of Imagery Instructions 
We investigated differences in the positive emotional response between dysphoric 
participants who did not receive any instructions and dysphoric participants who were 
instructed to use field perspective imagery when imagining positive memories. Within 
dysphoric individuals, a mixed ANOVA was performed with Time (before versus after the 
MIP) as within-subjects factor and MIP group (positive with imagery versus positive control) 
as between-subjects factor on the PANAS positive affect subscale. This analysis yielded only 
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a significant main effect of Time, F(1,34) = 30.61, p < .001, ηp² = .47, but no Time x MIP 
group interaction, F(1,34) = 1.42, p = .241, ηp² = .04. Results remained similar when adding 
(as a covariate) ratings on adopting an observer perspective to the analysis. Paired samples t-
tests showed that the dysphoric participants who received the positive MIP with imagery 
reported a significant increase in positive affect, t(17) = 4.13, p = .001, d = 1.35, as well as the 
dysphoric participants who received the positive control MIP without imagery instructions, 
t(17) = 3.73, p = .002, d = 0.81, in line with the result from the mixed ANOVA. However, 
although the change in positive affect did not significantly differ between these two groups, 
the dysphoric participants who received the positive MIP with imagery did report higher 
levels of positive affect after the induction, F(1,33) = 7.07, p = .012, ηp² = .18, when taking 
into account (as a covariate) variability in positive affect at baseline. Again, these results 
remained similar when also adding (as a covariate) the ratings on adopting an observer 
perspective. This discrepancy in results from the mixed ANOVA – indicating no group 
differences in the change in positive mood – and results from the ANCOVA – indicating that 
the group receiving instructions on field perspective imagery reported higher levels of 
positive affect after the MIP – may be explained by statistical issues. In randomized studies 
any pre-test group differences or variability is assumed to be due to sampling error. Using an 
ANCOVA (with the pretest measure as the covariate) minimizes the residual posttest 
variance, thereby minimizing the standard error of the group effect estimate, which increases 
power compared to an ANOVA on the change (i.e. the mixed ANOVA) [34]. Therefore, the 
ANCOVA analysis may have had more power to detect group differences at post-MIP 
controlling for pre-MIP variability in positive affect, as compared to a mixed ANOVA on 
group differences in the change in positive affect from pre- to post-MIP.   
4. Discussion 
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The main aim of this study was to investigate whether imagery of positive 
autobiographical memories would be as effective in evoking a positive emotional response in 
dysphoric individuals as in nondysphoric individuals when explicitly instructed and trained to 
use field perspective imagery. Specifically, we investigated whether giving explicit 
instructions and practice in field perspective imagery would result in similar use of field and 
observer perspective imagery in dysphoric and non-dysphoric participants, and whether this 
would influence the emotional response. Our main findings show that dysphoric and non-
dysphoric individuals who received instructions and practice in field perspective imagery 
indeed report to adopt a field and observer perspective to the same extent, and report a similar 
positive emotional response. That is, both dysphoric and non-dysphoric participants who 
receive instructions on field perspective imagery and recall a positive memory report an 
increase in positive affect, while those who recall a neutral memory do not. Across dysphoric 
and non-dysphoric individuals who receive instructions on field perspective imagery, the level 
of experienced depressive symptoms (i.e. BDI scores) relates to higher use of observer 
perspective imagery. 
Compared to non-dysphoric individuals, dysphoric individuals have been shown to use 
an observer perspective for positive memories to a greater extent [14], less vivid imagery of 
positive future events, and rate visual images as less positive [15]. The current findings, 
however, suggest that dysphoric individuals are not necessarily unable to imagine (positive) 
memories from a field perspective to the same extent as healthy individuals. However, this 
may be a less spontaneous way of processing, as our current results and previous studies show 
that without explicit instructions on field perspective imagery, dysphoric individuals use more 
observer perspective imagery with positive memories [12; 14]. Furthermore, the results 
showed that dysphoric and non-dysphoric individuals reported a similar positive emotional 
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response, and after the mood induction no longer differed in levels of positive affect despite 
baseline differences. 
Positive memory recall can be used to repair negative mood in healthy individuals, but 
has been shown to be an ineffective emotion regulation strategy for dysphoric, formerly 
depressed, and currently depressed individuals. However, if practice in field perspective 
imagery and explicitly adopting this perspective results in a similar positive emotional 
response as healthy individuals, this may improve the effectiveness of using positive memory 
recall as an emotion regulation strategy to overcome negative mood. Moreover, theories such 
as the broaden-and-build theory [22; 23] propose the experience of positive emotions to play a 
role in the development of psychological resilience. This highlights the need for effective 
procedures to evoke a positive emotional response in vulnerable populations with emotional 
disorder symptomatology. Interestingly, a recent study on prospective imagery in depressed 
individuals showed that vividness of positive prospective imagery predicted optimism levels 
over time [35]. Being able to vividly imagine a positive future may thus be an important 
‘skill’ to boost optimism. Similarly, our findings could be relevant in the context of cognitive 
bias modification where the aim is to override habitual ways of processing of emotional 
information. For example, a recent meta-analysis on the effectiveness of cognitive bias 
modification procedures to train towards a benign interpretation bias shows that the use of 
imagery was related to larger cognitive and emotional effects [36].  
A second aim of this study was to examine differences in effectivity of the positive 
mood induction between dysphoric individuals receiving instructions on field perspective 
imagery and dysphoric individuals who received no instructions on imagery. Results of the 
current study showed that the dysphoric individuals who did not receive instructions and 
practice in field perspective imagery adopted an observer perspective to a significantly higher 
extent than the dysphoric individuals who did receive these instructions, but there were no 
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significant differences in the reported use of field perspective. This is in line with previous 
findings showing that dysphoric individuals - without specific instructions - have a greater 
tendency to adopt an observer perspective when retrieving (positive) memories [14].   
The differences in the ratings of adopting an observer perspective between dysphoric 
individuals receiving instructions on field perspective imagery and those who did not, did not 
seem to directly influence the increase in positive affect. Furthermore, the two MIP groups 
did not significantly differ in the change in positive affect across the mood induction. Results 
did show though that the group receiving instructions on field perspective imagery reported 
higher levels of positive affect after the induction, when controlling for positive affect at 
baseline. This might be due to the fact that the latter analysis had more statistical power to 
detect differences between the group who received explicit instructions to use field 
perspective imagery and those who did not. The differential effect may thus not be large, and 
in our dysphoric sample the effect of positive memory recall on positive affect cannot only be 
attributed to the use of field perspective imagery. However, it’s possible that in more severely 
depressed individuals the difference in positive emotional response would be more 
pronounced, depending on whether people received explicit instructions to use field 
perspective imagery. A possible mechanism mediating the differential effects of imagery 
perspective could be that observer perspective imagery promotes evaluative thinking and 
increases the likelihood that the self is compared to an ideal standard, which could promote 
unfavorable self-comparisons especially in depressed individuals, reducing the positive 
emotional response [7; 11]. However, this remains speculation as the current findings do not 
allow us to draw conclusions about mechanisms underlying the differential effects of imagery 
perspective. 
There are several limitations to be noted regarding this study. First, we investigated a 
dysphoric sample and not a clinically depressed sample. However, dysphoric people are at 
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risk for developing a depression and previous studies have shown similar results with regard 
to the higher occurrence of observer memories in both depressed and dysphoric samples [11; 
14]. Moreover, investigating sub-clinical populations is relevant as use of mental imagery in 
relapse prevention would most likely target remitted- or sub-clinical populations. Secondly, 
due to the way data was collected for the extra control condition we did not randomly allocate 
the dysphoric individuals receiving no instructions on imagery to their MIP condition. This 
therefore violates design-based assumptions to statistical inference regarding the assumption 
of randomization during sampling. However, the issue of randomization does not necessarily 
influences model-based assumptions for statistical inference (e.g. distributional assumptions). 
A third limitation of this study regards the measurement scale to assess the extent to which 
participants adopted a field and observer perspective during imagery. The Likert scale may 
not have allowed for enough variance in reports on the adopted perspective to detect subtle 
differences between non-dysphoric and dysphoric participants, or participants receiving 
imagery instructions and those not. Furthermore, future research could also include 
manipulation checks assessing effort to adopt each perspective as it may be possible that 
dysphoric/depressed people, when instructed, adopt a field perspective to the same extent as 
healthy controls, but that this is more effortful for them.   
To summarize, results showed that when dysphoric and non-dysphoric individuals 
received instructions and practice in using field perspective imagery, dysphoric people 
imagined their positive autobiographical memories from a field and observer perspective to 
the same extent as non-dysphoric individuals. Moreover this resulted in a similar positive 
emotional response following imagery of their specific positive memories. However, when 
dysphoric individuals did not receive such instructions, allowing for a more spontaneous way 
of processing their memory, they reported to adopt an observer perspective to a higher extent. 
Although the change in positive mood did not seem to significantly differ between these 
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groups, higher levels of positive affect after memory recall were reported by the dysphoric 
individuals receiving instructions on field perspective imagery. This underscores the 
importance of providing explicit instructions on imagery perspective when using positive 
mental imagery in a (sub-clinical) depressed group. Such practice could potentially improve 
the effectiveness of positive memory recall as a mood repair strategy in (sub-clinically) 
depressed individuals, and may therefore have important therapeutic benefits. 
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